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Abstract 
 
 
 
Previous studies on management control in less developed countries have mainly 
concentrated on the state and privatised enterprises. Drawing upon Weber’s work (1958, 
1961, 1968, 1978) on traditional society, and a Weberian framework developed by Colignon 
and Covaleski (1991), this paper seeks to understand ‘private management practices’, 
including accounting, in a stock exchange listed company (public limited company). The case 
study evidence indicates that organisational controls are biased to serve the dominant owners 
or family/sponsors of the company instead of general shareholders. The paper argues that 
family dominance is facilitated by the external and internal layers within which the company 
is operating. The greater understanding of traditional societies developed in Weber’s works 
(1978) is very useful in explaining why managers work to serve the family. Domination by 
family via trusted managers using accounting calculations instead of bureaucracy is highly 
relevant, as the case study shows. These findings are not dissimilar to those of previous 
studies conducted in privatised and family-owned companies in Bangladesh and elsewhere. 
The paper calls for more research on management accounting practices employing Weber’s 
works, especially in traditional societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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This research stems from an interest in management accounting practices in less developed countries, 
especially Bangladesh. The little research that exists on management accounting in Bangladesh and 
indeed other less developed countries focuses primarily on state and privatised companies (for 
example, Uddin and Hopper, 1999, 2001; 2003; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Alam, 1997). Thus, 
the aim of the present study is to give a detailed account of private management practices, including 
accounting, in a stock exchange listed manufacturing company in Bangladesh (anonymised as PS). 
 
The proponents of privatisation and structural adjustment programmes in LDCs (less developed 
countries) argue that ‘private management practices’, induced by private ownership, are efficient and 
effective, and hence have greater productive and allocative efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
These arguments are based on the assumptions of neo-classical economic theories such as property 
rights, control in principal-agent relationships and theories of allocative efficiency (Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988; for details, see Uddin and Hopper, 2003). An efficient and effective management 
control system in the private sector requires certain capitalistic (ideal typical) structures such as well-
developed product, labour and capital markets and well-structured accountability and regulations, 
which tend to be rooted in advanced capitalistic countries (Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Uddin and 
Hopper, 2003). While these issues are significant to the arguments for the vibrant private sector in less 
developed and emerging economies, they remain under-researched. Prior work acknowledges 
previous studies on management control in less developed countries but neglects public limited 
companies (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Wickramsinghe and Hopper, 2005). Detail empirical 
investigations and a sound theoretical understanding of management accounting systems in public 
limited companies are essential to improve government policy and planning for practitioners, 
policymakers and academics to draw upon, especially in less developed countries (Uddin and Hopper, 
2003). The present paper seeks to fill this gap. The paper draws on Weber’s (1958, 1968, 1978) work 
on traditional society and a Weberian framework of accounting, developed by Colignon and 
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Covaleski (1991), to understand management control practices in a public limited company in 
Bangladesh. The paper addresses the following research questions: 
 
1) What forms of controls have management adopted in a public limited listed company, and 
how, if at all, did accounting help to achieve control at the organisational level? 
2) Could those management practices, including accounting (in a traditional society), be better 
understood by employing a Weberian framework of accounting? 
 
Several studies in less developed countries including Bangladesh have showed that the socio-
historical context, societal structure, global capitalism and politics have significant influence on 
organisational practices, including management controls (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001, 2003; Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989; Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Wickramasinghe and 
Hopper, 2005). Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) revealed that local societal and political structures, 
alongside other factors, render the rational control and performance model, derived from private 
management practices and prescribed aid agencies, ineffective. The performance measurement model 
has become marginal, ritualistic, and de-coupled from operations (see also Jones and Sefiane, 1992; 
Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989). Given the importance of structural conditions such as political 
institutions, culture and economic uncertainty in accounting in less developed countries, especially 
Bangladesh, a Weberian framework was deemed appropriate (Tinker, 1980; Burchell et al., 1980; 
Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Hopper et al., 1987; Armstrong, 1987, 1991; Hopwood and Miller, 1994; 
Colignon and Covaleski, 1991). The works of Weber (1958, 1961, 1968, 1978) on rational capital 
accounting, bureaucracy and traditional society are especially apt, despite its neglect in accounting 
research (Caramanis, 2005; Colignon & Covaleski, 1991). Weber’s framework implies the empirical 
variability of domination and resistance among different social groups (families and clans being one 
of the dominant social groups in traditional settings) with different substantive rationalities. Thus, the 
tensions between formal and substantive rationality provide a basis for examining accounting 
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practices as both an input to and an outcome of social processes. Weber’s use of accounting indicates 
that although accounting calculations may be considered neutral in their execution, accounting is not 
neutral in its consequences, which raises the issue of the social impact of accounting practices on 
organisations, industries and societies. Thus, accounting practices and procedures are mechanisms of 
domination and objects of struggle among social groups. This interpretation places the control of 
organizational accounting mechanisms at the centre stage of organisational analysis by incorporating 
the issues of substantive value interests, conflicts, coercion and resistance and legitimacy and 
membership.   
 
Previous accounting research, especially on the accounting profession and auditing, has applied 
Weber’s works (1958, 1961, 1968) to understand the development of accounting knowledge and 
professions and its influence upon the development of capitalism (see Chua and Poullaos, 1998; 
Auyeung and Ivory, 2003; Caramanis, 2005; Radcliffe, 1997). Radcliffe (1997) applies Weber’s notion 
of formal and substantive control to understand how substantive rationalities restrict the formal, rational 
tasks of government auditors. However, accounting research that draws upon Weber’s works is focused 
on accounting history and professional conflicts in the West (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, Covaleski and 
Aiken, 1986; Chua and Poullaos, 1998, Caramanis, 2005).  Very few studies such as Dyball and 
Valcarcel (1999), Dyball et al., (2006) and Auyeung and Ivory (2003) are located in traditional settings. 
These studies employed Weber’s notion of the traditional vs. the rational to understand why modern 
models or rational ways of doing things do not seem to capture local complexities and intricacies. 
Similarly, this paper, drawing on Dyball and Valcarcel (1999) and Dyball et al., (2006), seeks to use 
the wealth of Weber’s thought in trying to understand management controls, including accounting, 
especially in a traditional society. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the theoretical constructs underpinning the research are 
outlined. These draw from Weber’s works (1958, 1961, 1968, 1978), especially those centred on 
rationalities, domination and control. Contextual information about Bangladesh, the firm researched 
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(PS), and its changing ownership is woven into this section. The research methods are then described, 
followed by the case study. The case study section reports on management controls in PS. This is 
followed by the discussion section, which iterates empirical findings with the theoretical arguments. 
The paper concludes by returning to the original research questions. 
 
WEBERIAN FRAMEWORK: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF ORGANISATIONAL 
CONTROL  
 
Theoretically, Weber’s framework, developed by Colignon and Covaleski (1991), provides a critical 
and political basis for evaluating management control practices, including accounting. Colignon and 
Covaleski (1991) argue that three layers of analyses are useful to provide a fuller understanding of 
organisational practices, including accounting. They are: structural conditions (external layers), the 
historical context (external layers) and the institutional/organisational context. Each of these layers 
provides distinctive insights into the context in which accounting practices are examined. According 
to Weber, they are separate but interacting methodologies. These layers are discussed below. 
 
Structural and historical context of accounting (external layers) 
 
To Weber, rational calculations of economic actions and accounting are based on certain structural 
conditions, including free labour, markets, technology, rational economic law etc. These structural 
conditions within a society facilitate rational accounting/calculations such as profitability. However, 
Weber sees these as ideal typical conditions and a starting point for the development of rational 
capitalism. The idea typical/rational capitalism was not fully or partly realised, as the structural 
conditions interact with socio-political, cultural and historical contexts. Weber also recognised the 
different economic conditions (i.e. traditionalism) in less developed countries, as these countries have 
a very different structural and socio-political context from the West. Weber focused on specific 
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cultural and historical details to identify specific features of society that facilitate or obstruct the full 
development of rational capitalism, the modern enterprise and rational capital accounting. Weber also 
recognised the role of competing ideas, conflicts and institutions and how they influence capitalism, 
enterprises and accounting practices (Uddin and Chowdhury, 2007). 
 
Historical analysis serves as an extension and complement to structuralists’ discussions of the 
institutional requirements for the development of the modern capitalistic market, rational enterprise 
and accounting practices, as discussed in the previous section. The departure between actual and ideal 
types of capitalistic regime, including accounting regimes (rational or irrational), can be explained by 
Weber’s analysis of rationalisation, as outlined earlier. Weber identified two forms of paradoxical 
economic actions: formal and substantive rationality. The formal type, alternatively called the ideal 
type, views the organisation and society very technically and considers that it should be possible to 
control the world through calculations. Here, rationality is a consequence of empirical knowledge, its 
mathematical form, and its presumed universal application (Colignon & Covaleski, 1991, p.145). This 
view is also value neutral and only accepts certain types of calculation, such as accounting models in 
the West. The substantive rationality of economic action is an inherently evaluative concept, denoting 
the degree to which an economic system (such as a capitalist market, rational enterprise or 
accounting) provides for the needs, ends or values of a specific social group (Brubaker, 1984, p.11). 
This is a rationality of “ultimate ends” (Weber, 1968, p.499). This form of rationality addresses the 
substance of the values, ends and needs of social groups and the institutions that promote them. Thus, 
economic action is substantively rational if it is consistent with the values or ends of a specific social 
group or institution, and irrational if it is inconsistent with these values or ends (Colignon & 
Covaleski, 1991, p.146).  
 
The tension between formal and substantive rationality is both a tension between conflicting values 
and a tension between social groups with divergent interests. Weber (1968, 1978) recognised these 
tensions in a more traditional form of society and their implications for organisational bureaucracy 
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and accounting rationality.  In Weberian terms, traditional domination of economic activities tends to 
strengthen traditional attitudes (Uddin and Choudhury, 2007). Traditional domination restricts the 
development of markets (labour, product and capital) but develops a consumptive economy, making 
rational capitalism difficult. Dyball et al., (2006), drawing on Weber’s (1978) characterisation of 
rational and traditional societies, further highlight the differences between rational and traditional 
societies. They argue, in Weberian terms, that the institutions of the community, market and state are 
conjoined in traditional societies, but modern/rational societies aspire to keep them separate and 
autonomous. The conjoined nature of the traditional society ‘makes accountability relationships lean 
towards the personal and the perpetual as opposed to the objective and ephemeral (as found in modern 
variants of market and state). This would suggest that the power of accounting as an articulation of 
accountability relationships is muted, if not ignored, in traditional societies’ (p. 53). Thus, the paper 
argues that an understanding of traditional society enables the researcher to explain the nature of 
controls at PS. 
 
Organisational Analysis 
 
Weber (1958, 1961 & 1968) argues for separate organisational analyses that are nonetheless 
interactive, with external layers of analysis to understand management practices, including accounting 
ones. To Weber, researchers need to go beyond the internal forces to gain a broader understanding of 
organisational practices, including management controls. The external layers provide the basis for 
situating a specific case or enterprise for further analysis of its accounting practices within a shorter 
time span. 
 
At the organisational level, Weber (1968) develops two axes of tension that, when taken together, 
serve to frame his analysis of the interplay of forces, agencies and interests as they relate to 
accounting practices. The first axis is formal and substantive rationality and the second is dominance 
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and resistance. These two axes help us to understand certain accounting practices at the organisational 
level. Weber describes modern organisations as systems based on formal rationality with no inherent 
connection to specific substantive ends or outcomes. Organizations can serve the interests of social, 
political or economic elites, the general needs of the community or some combination, but the 
analysis of formal rationality alone tells us nothing about its directions or outcomes. Colignon and 
Covaleski (1991) argue that although these two forms of rationality are analytically separate, with 
each being subject to the forces of the other, interpretation follows from the examinations of particular 
institutional circumstances. Multiple rationalities are characteristic of the modern enterprise and are 
the basis of conflicts, which make the distinction between formal and substantive rationality important 
in their application to issues of accounting practices (p.150).  
 
The domination of persons and groups by organisational mechanisms and the resistance of these 
social actors to these mechanisms is the second axis of analysis in organisational control. Bureaucracy 
is a means of domination whose use and direction are distinct and whose consequences for social 
action are central to organisational analyses. Accounting practices are key elements of the 
bureaucratic means of domination. Weber (1968) argues that ‘strict capital accounting is further 
associated with the social phenomena of “shop discipline” and appropriation of the means of 
production, and that means: with the existence of a “system of domination”’ (p.108). This quote 
highlights accounting’s normal tendency to favour one social group within the organisation and 
society. However, much of Weber’s construct of domination is as an ideal type non-evaluative tool. 
Weber is also of the view that the merely external fact of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to 
signify domination in our sense: we cannot overlook the meaning of the fact that the command is 
accepted as a valid norm (1968, p.946). Weber suggests that accounting practices are mechanisms of 
domination, constraint and control, and that this domination is incomplete. This framework of tension 
between domination and resistance applies to tensions, struggles and conflicts among social groups 
with different substantive rationalities over the construction and application of different accounting 
procedures and practices. Accounting practices and procedures are objects of tension between 
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different social groups representing different interpretations, interests or substantive rationalities 
within a specific organization.  
 
However, these tensions, struggles and various rationalities may take a new form if the organisation is 
situated in a traditional society, as articulated in Table One. 
 
[Insert Table One] 
 
Bureaucratic domination in enterprises in a traditional type society is often superseded by direct 
control from the dominant owners of the companies (who are often part of a family: Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001, 2003). Weber identifies this as traditional domination. Dyball and Valcarcel (1999), 
referring to Weber’s work, clarify this point: “Traditionalist domination is commonly exercised by 
members of a ruling family(ies) or clan(s) and, unlike legal authority, is primarily based on personal 
loyalty. There is a “personal master”, not a “superior”; served not by an “administrative staff”, but by 
“personal retainers”. Instead of “members of an organisation”, there are “traditional comrades”. 
Obedience is to the “master”, not to “enacted rules”. The “master” is expected to do good turns, 
governed by an ethical sense of equity or of utilitarian expediency. His exercise of power is bound 
only by resistance from his “subjects”. It is impossible, then, for an “impartial” law or administrative 
rule to be intentionally created by legislation (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, p.307; Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2007). 
 
Weber’s works (1978) consequently expect management controls in a private enterprise in a 
traditional society like Bangladesh to resist the rational control model or ideal bureaucracy and ideal 
typical accounting regulations. Familial/direct control from the owners is a more likely outcome in 
private enterprises and gives rise to a different substantive rationality for compliance. Westernised 
delegated control in private enterprises may be perceived by policy-makers as a condition of the stable 
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economic calculation of a “rational” society. Its efficacy is dependent on knowledge of techniques 
(that is, accounting and auditing standards) and facts (clients’ accounts: Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, 
p. 307).  In a traditional setting, Weber (1978) expects the property and productive capacities of 
individual economic units to be primarily geared towards satisfying the “master’s” needs and 
preferences: that is, they are governed by a substantive rationality of economic action (Dyball and 
Valcarcel, 1999, p.307). The study investigates whether this is so in PS and Bangladesh. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Data collection methods are dictated by the research questions, such as ‘why’ and ‘how’, that were set 
out earlier (Yin, 2003). The research relied on various sources of data including interviews, 
observation, analysis of relevant documents and the examination of newspaper reports. This also 
enabled the researcher to strengthen the validation process. Data collection and validation was a 
particular challenge: as Dyball and Valcarcel (1999) point out, secrecy is part and parcel of a 
traditional society. The data was gathered over five months in two stages. Newspaper reports were 
documented and examined, largely to facilitate historical analysis. This has provided the necessary 
foundation for an understanding of the managerial activities and responses within the organisation. 
During the first stage of the research, 40 interviews were conducted with employees at different levels 
and departments. Questions were asked in an open-ended fashion to encourage interviewees to 
respond freely. These interviews generally lasted between one and two hours. Notes were taken 
during each interview. Reports were collected from the PS office and the stock exchange, in addition 
to library and newspaper searches to validate and supplement the interview and observational data. 
Observations were made during the interviews and notes were taken at the end of the day’s 
interviews. One particular observation place was the tea and coffee room, which was frequently 
visited by the top managers1. 
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Permission was not granted to talk to production workers or trade union leaders, despite several 
requests to management. The researcher’s visits to the factory were also strictly scrutinised. Normally, 
no outsider can access the factory without a proper introduction from a high official. During my visit, 
I had a very brief chat with a shop steward, but our conversation was curtailed abruptly. At the second 
stage, the researcher conducted a follow-up study. Four interviews were conducted with senior 
managers in PS. A further attempt was made by the author to conduct some interviews with shop 
stewards and trade union leaders, but without any success.  
 
A number of questions and issues were discussed during the interviews, including decision-making 
processes, budgeting and accounting practices, owner-managers’ involvement, perceptions of the use 
of accounting calculations, future expansions and innovations and other minor issues. Respondents 
were willing to talk about these issues, giving their interpretations of events. This was achieved due to 
the researcher’s frequent emphasis upon anonymity. Interview results were subsequently reported to 
interviewees and some changes were made as requested. Some of the comments by the respondents 
had to be deleted, as they were sensitive to family members (owners of the company). The researcher 
presented and discussed case study evidence with various respondents, the academic community and 
members of an accountancy body (institute of cost and management accountants of Bangladesh). 
This, I believe, enhanced internal and external validity (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The theoretical 
approach adopted here directed the presentation of empirical findings to achieve a flow of arguments 
in the paper.  
 
External Layers of the Case Study - Historical, Political and Economic Context of Bangladesh 
 
According to a Weberian framework, the research needs to locate the organisation in a wider context 
for a broader understanding of organisational practices, including management controls. The external 
layers of the case are discussed below. 
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Bangladesh (then called East Bengal), a part of India, was ruled by both Muslim and Hindu Emperors 
for centuries until the British East India Company came to India. The British East India Company 
took occupation of all parts of India one after another, Bangladesh being the first to be occupied in 
1757. Export, import and tax holidays were the initial strategies of the British East India Company. 
The colonial British regime became formally involved in Indian affairs in 1857. The Colonial British 
regime, like the East India Company, was not interested in setting up any industry for the economic 
development of British India. Rather, they were interested in producing raw materials for industries in 
Britain (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980) and providing structural conditions such as free markets (labour, 
product and capital) and other means of production for capitalists, especially non-indigenous people 
(Prasad and Negandhi, 1968). Sobhan (1980) pointed out that there was not one single large-scale 
industrial enterprise in East Bengal (now Bangladesh) that was controlled by Bengali Muslims 
(locals) during the colonial period, whereas most of the workers were from local villages and towns. 
This form of colonial capitalism was racial and physically coercive, which led to its demise 
(Burawoy, 1985; Uddin and Hopper, 2001). 
 
In 1945, Bangladesh became part of Pakistan, and was known as East Pakistan. Following the British 
tradition, the Pakistani Government encouraged the private sector and limited the public sector. Not 
surprisingly, this strategy did not fully materialise for a number of reasons, including lack of private 
capital (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). Thus, the public sector was encouraged later, particularly in East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh). The Pakistani government promoted the private sector by giving incentives 
and creating a favourable environment within which the private sector could undertake protected 
investment. This was to create an ideal typical capitalistic mode of production in a bid to increase the 
state’s accumulation. The country was controlled by West Pakistani army personnel, bureaucrats and 
politicians. Many believed that there was a conscious and deliberate political and bureaucratic hand in 
promoting West Pakistani ownership (Ahmad, 1976; Sobhan, 1982). The Pakistani government 
policies of giving direct and indirect facilities to the private sector did help to create a generation of 
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mostly non-Bengali capitalists, who were highly successful in transferring resources from East 
Pakistan to West Pakistan to the amount of $US 6000 million (Khan, 1986). This is similar to 
Weber’s arguments for ideal capitalism, where structural conditions are favourable to the emergence 
of capitalism. However, he also argued that the ideal form of capitalism would be transformed into a 
substantive form as a result of country-specific cultural, political and historical conditions. Hence, he 
compared American and European capitalism. He also recognised the traditional forms of capitalism 
elsewhere, such as Bangladesh. Similarly, the attempts made by the state during the Pakistan period 
were based on race, politics and nepotism (Sobhan and Ahmed, 1980). At one stage, 22 families (all 
Pakistani) were controlling the majority share of Pakistan’s industrial assets (Sobhan and Ahmad, 
1980). Kochanek (1996) pointed out that 18% of all industrial assets belonged to Bengalis, whereas 
47% were owned by Pakistani families. Economic exploitation and political suppression by West 
Pakistani bureaucrats, politicians and the army led first to disenchantment, then to bitterness and 
finally to resistance, leading to the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980, Sobhan, 
1982).  
 
The demise of the Pakistani rule was seen as a threat to the physical security of the West Pakistani 
capitalists, forcing them leave East Pakistan. This eventually created a conspicuous shortage of 
private capital in East Pakistan. The first Bangladeshi Government was motivated by socialistic 
movements, and due to the shortage of private capital, stressed a greater role of the state in the 
operations of economic activity through state ownership and control. Consequently, the 
nationalisation programme of Bangladesh came into force in 1972, enabling the state to hold 92% of 
the total industrial assets. However, the ideal typical state capitalism never materialised, although it 
shaped the new form of capitalism (for details, see Uddin and Hopper, 2001). Strong trade unions, 
political turbulence and severe resource constraints led the state’s accumulation into serious financial 
difficulties (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980; Uddin, 1987; Murshed, 1989). The Bangladeshi government 
came under mounting economic and political pressure from international lending agencies and the 
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West to re-orient its economic policies (Adam et al., 1992; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Soon after 
the fall of the first democratic government, the military government gladly accepted the policy 
prescriptions from the lending agencies with the blessing of the USA and the West. The state policies 
were redirected towards the private accumulation of capital.  
 
The Bangladeshi government embarked on wholesale privatisation and redundancy programmes. 
Protection for trade unions and workers was drastically reduced in order to create compliant labour 
markets for private capital (Sobhan, 1982; Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003, 1999). State enterprises 
were sold to families at low prices, giving rise to family capitalism in Bangladesh (Uddin and Hopper, 
2003). This trend of capitalism emerged in the context of family-led politics, a poor regulatory 
framework, weak enforcement of existing corporate laws and a generally very weak capital market 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2007). As Uddin and Hopper (2003) reported, ‘coupled to poor financial 
regulation and legal enforcement and weak capital markets, it was a breeding ground for crony 
capitalism associated with familial transacting, patronage, and irregular financial practices’ (Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003, p.768). Uddin and Choudhury (2007) argued that the poor form of governance and 
accountability is also linked with post-independence Bangladesh’s family-led political parties (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2007). Weber (1978) predicted these outcomes in a traditional form of society. The 
prediction is that structural conditions for rational capitalism will not be fully developed, and will be 
shaped and transformed by the strong presence of family and clan culture (Dyball et al., 2006; Dyball 
and Valcarcel, 1999). Weber (1968, 1978) recognised the effects of familial or clan ownership upon 
internal organisation and external accountability. The social and political conditions set the context 
for familial and arbitrary control, one form of substantive control, at the organisational level. This 
tends to be associated with harsh internal controls that physically transmit the owner’s whims rather 
than the management systems of the large, institutionally owned and professionally managed 
companies that characterise Western and global capitalism. This paper investigates whether this is so 
in this case study. 
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Case Study Findings – Organisational Context 
 
Founded in 1976 and based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, PS manufactures and sells generic pharmaceutical 
products, active pharmaceutical ingredients and intravenous fluids. PS was one of the divisions 
(formerly called the Chemical Division) of a big business group (anonymised here as X). The X group 
of companies has a number of big businesses in Bangladesh. This group was founded by a family and 
is now controlled by two brothers. Over the years, divisions under this group have been transformed 
into public limited companies and listed on stock exchanges. The tradition is that the group starts a 
business (as one of its divisions) and then lists the division on the Stock exchange to sell shares to the 
public to raise funds, keeping a significant amount of the total shares under their jurisdiction. They 
remain sponsors and the dominant shareholders of each company. In a similar vein, PS’s shares were 
offloaded to the public in 1985 (nine years after its inception), retaining approximately 40% of the 
total shares for the X group, making the group (i.e. the two brothers) the main shareholders and 
ultimate controllers of the company. One of the two brothers is the chairman of PS’s Board of 
Directors and the other is the vice chairman. Other members of the board are their friends and family 
members. The same people are also the members of the Boards of Directors of many other companies 
previously under the X group. 
 
Since 1985, PS has been growing rapidly, like many other pharmaceutical companies2 in Bangladesh. 
PS is one of Bangladesh’s oldest pharmaceutical companies and is currently one of the leading 
generic pharmaceutical companies, with around an 8 per cent share of the Bangladeshi finished 
formulations market. PS manufactures 106 products with 172 strengths. The manufacturing range is 
very wide, covering almost all major therapeutic classes, dosage forms and strengths. The product 
ranges includes tablets, capsules, syrups, suspensions, solutions, drops, creams, ointments, inhalers 
and gels. PS is based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where it operates from a site spanning 20 acres and has 
over 1800 employees3 and workers. The official accounting report indicates that PS generated 
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revenues of approximately GBP23.5 million in 2004 and generated profits after tax of GBP2.8 
million. This paper seeks to understand how this profitable public limited company is being managed. 
This is discussed below. 
 
Organisation Structure –Informal Relationship  
 
Formally, PS has four major departments, including Marketing and Sales, Finance, Production and 
Medical Research. All the departmental heads report to the CEO. There are some minor departments, 
which are under the direct control of the CEO. They include MIS, Purchase Planning, Export, Human 
Resources and Internal Auditing. These formal channels are overshadowed by the informal 
relationship. The CEO often intervenes in various marketing and production affairs without engaging 
in formal communications with the respective departmental heads, as one senior manager revealed. 
The executive director (sales) commented that he reports directly to the CEO, although officially, the 
marketing director is his line manager. The CEO intervenes and breaks the formal channels if he 
thinks they are important for the company, as confirmed by many interviewees.  
 
Recruitment and promotions are often made without the proper channels (the human resource 
department is often not informed). Interviews with managers in the human resource department 
revealed that they are unable to keep up with all the sudden changes. They are not always involved 
with or informed of changes or even new recruitments, especially to top and middle level managerial 
positions. One of the officers, who supplied the basic organisational structure to the researcher, 
admitted that they were not up to date and asked that the necessary adjustments be made as the 
researcher interviewed employees within the organisation. It was also found that there are a number of 
people who are officially employed by PS but who do not perform any official tasks for PS, working 
instead for other group X companies. For example, three members of the executive committee in PS 
are inactive. Respondents said: “they are working for group X”. This is not even a secret issue. It was 
often difficult for the researcher to identify whether people at the top level were working for PS 
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exclusively or for other companies under the group’s jurisdiction. Interviews and observations often 
revealed that they were involved with multiple tasks concerning other companies but PS. Employees 
did not seem to find it unusual to work for companies other than PS. Many individuals informed the 
researchers that PS also had employees, recruited on request from influential persons, who had no 
specific tasks (ghost employees) but simply received salaries and other benefits from the company. 
This interesting payroll list includes one of the top officials. Many managers believed that “this 
particular individual has been with the company and the group for a long time. Therefore, this is one 
way of rewarding the individual for his contribution to the group”. There is even an individual who 
has been receiving monthly salaries (albeit not a significant amount) for as long as the accountants 
can remember (probably since the inception of the division). The accountants have no idea who this 
person is and why he has been receiving a salary.  
 
To sum up, recruitments, promotions and structures, not surprisingly, are arbitrary and informal. As a 
consequence, the official organisational structure does not reflect the actual division of tasks and 
responsibilities. The rational structure is overwhelmed by traditional relationships. As Weber (1968) 
argues, there is a “personal master”, not a “superior”; served not by an “administrative staff” but by 
“personal retainers.” Instead of “members of an organisation”, there are “traditional comrades”. This 
will be further illustrated in the discussion section. 
 
Top-down Decision Making Processes – Loyalty to Family 
 
According to annual reports and other documentation, a five-member executive committee is 
officially responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the business. Observations revealed 
that just two members of the executive committee (the Finance Director and the CEO) dominate the 
entire affair. The executive committee is officially accountable to the board of directors, who are also 
representatives of the X group. In contrast to other small companies, the two brothers do not directly 
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involve themselves with the daily affairs of the firm, mainly because of their involvement with such a 
large number of companies. Nevertheless, they have two trusted top managers at PS, namely the 
Finance Director and the CEO. The Finance Director informed the researcher that the CEO and the 
Finance Director usually speak with one of the two brothers (the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of 
the company) on an almost daily basis. There is also a seven-member management committee, made 
up of the heads of various departments, namely the CEO, the Finance Director, the Marketing 
Director, the Executive Director (sales), the Production Manager, the head of Medical Research and 
the Senior Finance Manager. The management committee meets formally once or twice a month, but 
decisions are often made informally via telephone conversations or meetings between the Finance 
Director and the CEO. Information is passed to the CEO and the Finance director via email, 
telephone, over a cup of coffee and through various other informal channels. Interviews with other 
members of the management committee gave the researcher the impression that they also do not see 
any necessity to arrange regular meetings. Even if there are meetings, they are a mere formality. 
Members of the management committee do not tend to disagree with the CEO, as the observations 
revealed. Departmental heads (minor or major) hardly exercise (or are able to exercise) their official 
authority and power to take major decisions, with the exception of the finance director. Observations 
revealed that HoDs tend to wait for the green light from the CEO to finalise even routine decisions. 
The CEO usually has the final word on all decisions except on financial matters. Managers, with the 
exception of the CEO and the Finance Director, see themselves as information providers rather than 
key decision makers. The informal nature of the decision-making process is reflected in all aspects of 
company affairs. For example, one manager revealed, “according to the company law and other 
corporate governance rules, the board of directors need to meet regularly, but this has never 
happened. Many decisions are taken and consultations held over the telephone. Necessary documents 
are prepared for external purposes.” However, it was very difficult for the researcher to corroborate 
the above malpractices; suffice to say that formality is the last thing these two executive members (the 
CEO and the Finance Director) seek. One manager said: “they don’t need to maintain formality as 
long as they keep in touch with the owners over the telephone and consult them if necessary”. 
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Weber’s bureaucracy is replaced by family domination, as expected from an organisation in a 
traditional society. 
 
Accounting System – Serving the Family’s Interests 
 
The finance department is one of the major functional departments in PS. This department is headed 
by the Finance director, who is one of the key players in the decision-making processes in PS. Apart 
from keeping accounting records, the main job of this department is to keep the top management up to 
date about cash levels on a daily basis. The daily cash position seems to be a very important piece of 
information for top management, including the family members. Observations revealed that most of 
the Finance Director’s day involves meetings with creditors and bankers. His tasks include opening 
letters of credit for import (raw materials etc) and arranging short-term and long-term loans. 
Maintaining liquidity is a major task for the finance director. Being successful and having all-cash 
sales, this company should not be excessively concerned with its cash position. This raises the 
question of whether the family is using the company as a cash cow for its other ventures, legally or 
illegally. It is alleged that PS’s cash surplus is often used by other companies under Group X, to the 
extent that PS often it finds difficult to find the cash to buy materials. One of the brothers always 
maintains a direct link with the finance director and is constantly updated. It was notoriously difficult 
for the researcher to corroborate the above allegations, but evidence of some accounting malpractices 
were found, as will be discussed later. 
 
The other major task of the finance department includes dealing with payments and receipts and 
preparing annual accounts. They consider their most important task to be cash forecasting and 
budgeting. The controlling aspects of budgeting does not seem to receive any attention from the 
finance department.  One of the finance managers revealed: “most of my office hours are spent 
signing payment receipts”. The finance department often passes information to the Product Planning 
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Department on request. Information is not normally passed on to any departments unless it is 
specifically asked for, as one manager revealed. Managers from other departments would not have the 
slightest idea about the company’s financial position (Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003).  This situation 
serves the substantive purposes of the owner-managers. The Finance Director, the CEO and certain 
PS finance officials keep all financial information secret. It is processed according to the Finance 
Director or the CEO’s instructions. These top officials ultimately report back to the family members. 
An accountant reported: “Family members receive verbal reports regarding cash and other 
transactions from the finance director frequently if not daily. The CEO and Finance Director receive 
daily reports from junior officials in order to have a clear understanding about the financial 
condition of the company.” As another accountant remarked: “Middle Level managers can sign off 
some of the daily transactions within some limits. Consent (most of the time verbal) is needed from the 
family members if there is a big bill.”  
 
There are strong allegations regarding the reliability of accounting reports presented to general 
shareholders. Several respondents expressed their doubts about the accuracy of annual reports, since 
their preparation was not transparent to either managers or general shareholders. The specific 
allegation is that the company keeps two sets of reports. The official reports, audited and certified by 
professional auditors, are misleading and do not reflect a true and fair view of the company. It was 
extremely difficult for the researcher to confirm the allegation that PS keeps a number of sets of 
accounting reports. However, the keeping of two or more sets of records is not an unusual practice, as 
previous studies have suggested (Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003). X group, like many other public 
limited companies, has been subject to various investigations and court cases in the past but has been 
able to thwart the proceedings using financial and political influence (Uddin and Choudhury, 2007; 
The Daily Star, 2007).  
 
PS’s accounting reports, like those of many other companies, are prepared somewhat secretively as 
far as tax is concerned. Excise duty and income tax matters are dealt with informally by the official 
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concerned. It has been alleged that sometimes the headings of transactions are changed to avoid tax, 
e.g. by increasing the number of tax-exempted items. One manager admitted that: “We don’t have to 
worry about these matters, since extra money to tax officials normally resolves the problem. To be 
honest, it does not matter whether you submit true accounts or not: tax officials will find a gap to 
negotiate their extra money.” Auditing appears relatively light compared to common practice 
elsewhere. One individual commented: “Some informal/cash transactions are needed, especially for 
irregular payments to various government officials and even some trade union leaders. I have no idea 
how these transactions appear in the annual reports.” Recently, PS came under serious investigation 
simultaneously from various authorities. The SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) has requested 
information from the company, as suspicion has arisen about their accounting reports. Tax and custom 
authorities are undertaking serious investigations about tax dodging and unpaid custom duties. There 
are also allegations that the rate of dividends declared and paid is not significant at all, given that PS 
is a commercially successful company in Bangladesh. Soon after the new government took over in 
2007, all of the companies involved in group X came under review4. The allegations are that Group X 
has extracted hundreds of millions of taka from the share market by giving false information about the 
companies to the public (The Daily Star, 2007). There are also further allegations against the two 
brothers for being loan defaulters. They have outstanding loans to many nationalised and even private 
banks, amounting to approximately 4.25 billion taka. They have managed to get these loans using 
money, family connections and also political influence (The Daily Star, 2007) 
 
PS’s links with the X group do not seem to raise any suspicion among most of its employees. They 
seem to have accepted this as the norm, and even the diversion of funds is not seen as illegal by many 
employees. In other words, this is not even a secret. The researcher found that many lower level 
managers are not even aware that the family only officially owns less than 40% of the total shares of 
PS. Many of these employees have also been appointed since the inception of the company as a 
division of the group in 1985. Transformation from the division to a separate entity and being listed 
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on stock exchanges have apparently not had any significant influence on their attitudes and loyalty. In 
Weberian terms, employees are loyal to the family members or fictive kin as they consider themselves 
“personal retainers” instead of administrative staff or members of the organisation.  
 
Budgets – Arbitrary and Informal 
 
Budgets, in the normal sense of routine, regular, downwards financial reporting to managers, are 
absent. Such transparent and rational accounting was not found in PS, which was not unexpected, 
given that it is a company in a traditional setting (Weber, 1968, 1978). More importantly, the finance 
department has little to do with actually preparing sales and production budgets, apart from the cash 
budget.  
 
The sales budget is an important function for the marketing department and PS. The marketing 
function is divided into two departments. One is dedicated to sales and other is concerned with 
product planning, promotion and innovations. The sales department has a team of strong field 
representatives collecting primary sales data. Altogether, there are 608 sales representatives working 
across the whole country. Each of the sales representatives works for bonuses that are linked to their 
sales targets. The executive director of sales commented: “I monitor sales positions continuously and 
receive updated data on an hourly basis”. He also revealed that he receives feedback from sales 
representatives not only on their own sales positions, but also on competitors’ positions. This 
information helps them to prepare and revise their sales budgets. The marketing department has a 
section dedicated to market research. Information from market research, alongside sales 
representatives’ feedback, provides the basis for the sales budget. Achieving daily sales targets seems 
to be very important not only to sales managers but to all. Mid and top level managers see it as key to 
their survival. During the weeks when the researcher was interviewing employees, a consecutive 
decline in sales spawned panic throughout the sales and accounts departments.  
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There is no formal budget committee, but formal and informal discussions between the executive 
director (sales) and the CEO provide the signals for the preparation of the sales budget. The annual 
budget, expressed in physical terms, is reviewed monthly and even daily. On receiving real-time 
information from the field, the executive director of sales informs the CEO (not the marketing 
director, who is his line manager), who then instructs production managers to reshuffle budgets and 
change product lines if necessary.  A senior production manager remarked, “We revise targets as new 
information comes through. Continuous connections between production, sales and finance are 
vital.”  Production managers are there to execute the commands of the CEO, who monitors them 
through the rapid informal feedback of results. Decisions are centred on the CEO. The head of the 
Production Department commented, “We discuss with the CEO if we have problems producing 
according to the sales budget. The CEO normally makes the final decisions”. These direct, centralised 
controls place heavy demands on employees and production workers to meet their budgets. One 
production manager commented: “We have no choice but to produce. We have a very tight schedule 
for production, since the production budget is even reshuffled daily due to the market situation”. The 
idea is that if there is a demand, production must meet it, as long as other production factors meet the 
criteria, with the exception of labour. One chemist (production manager) revealed: “input from 
managers is not normally sought let alone the workers in the factory.”  
 
Top management (the CEO and the Finance Director) do not only use physical budget figures to 
evaluate the performance of production and sales managers, but also utilise other informal feedback. 
Managers do not make written variance reports. Oral reports to the CEO are delivered over the phone 
or face to face quite frequently, as managers reported. In addition, the strong presence of the CEO in 
the daily affairs of the production division does save the production managers from a lot of 
explanations. As the chief production manager put it: “The CEO knows everything, so we don’t need 
to provide official explanations”. Nevertheless, achieving production targets is extremely important to 
the top management. The target setting disciplines production managers not because of any accepted 
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logic or reason in the numbers, or through reinforcement by rewards, but because of power relations. 
The CEO, and to some extent the Finance Director, is the final authority on recruitment, punishment, 
promotion, dismissal and all other company matters. The family members do not normally interfere 
with daily affairs, except in big decisions. The absence of family members provides huge power to top 
management officials, especially the CEO and the Finance Director, as they believe that the family 
places a great deal of trust in them (having become their fictive kin). 
 
Product Promotion, Innovation and Pricing – Rational Attitudes 
 
Product promotion is one of the most important parts of the marketing division. This department not 
only promotes existing products but also introduces new products. However, the CEO’s blessing is 
required to go ahead with new products. The company expects to introduce new products or new 
designs for current products each month, at negligible cost.  For example, during the 2004-05 
financial year, the company introduced 24 new drugs (including variations of old drugs) into the 
market. Feedback from the extensive sales force and the market research department provides the 
necessary information regarding demand for a new product. PS also subscribes to an international 
company, which publishes reports on the demand for drugs from each country. Product managers of 
this department spend considerable time in strategising new and old products. There are thirteen 
product managers who are pharmacists with MBA degrees. Each of the product managers is 
responsible for designing and marketing a group of products. Before products are launched, this 
department conducts the necessary calculations, such as cost-benefit analysis, pricing and marketing 
policy. For many products, government regulations play an important role in pricing. For example, the 
government has set out an essential product list, and companies producing these products have to 
follow set price guidelines. Product promotion managers informed the researcher that 20% of PS’s 
products are on this list. For other products (if they are not new to the market), the company normally 
sets a price that reflects the cost plus 50% as a rule of thumb. One of the managers commented: “sales 
prices are reviewed every 6 months - 2 years depending on the situation. This performance depends 
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on existing product performance”. All these points seem to resemble Weber’s rational calculations of 
product promotion and introduction. However, these rational accounting calculations do fit in with the 
substantive purposes of family members. 
 
Discussion  
 
This paper focuses on issues derived from a Weberian framework introduced by Colingnon and 
Covaleski and draws on the works of Dyball and Valcarcel (1999) and Dyball et al. (2006) on 
traditional societies. Weber argues for separate organisational analyses, which are nonetheless 
interactive with external layers of analysis, to understand management practices, including 
accounting. As explained in the empirical sections, the intentions of the state (at development stages) 
to facilitate the development of a rational form/ideal type of capitalism were transformed into a 
different form (politicised state capitalism) as a result of social, political and cultural clashes (Uddin 
and Hopper, 2001). The recent attempt at privatisation, as found in many studies, gave rise to 
family/crony capitalism (Uddin and Hopper, 2003). It was also found that these privatised companies, 
after being handed over to families, introduced familial, direct and coercive control to replace 
bureaucratic control (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). A similar pattern was followed in public limited 
companies, as the case study findings indicate. Applying the axes of control (see Table One) based on 
Weber’s works, the following subsections provide some explanations of organisational control at PS. 
 
The 1st axis of control, as shown in Table One, indicates that organisations in a “traditional” society 
like Bangladesh are more likely rely on informal, familial and personal control and give rise to a 
different substantive rationality for compliance, such as forms of control that serve dominant owners. 
The case study evidence shows that the organisational practices, including the uses of accounting (in 
decision-making and external reporting), are dictated by the family’s interests and desires.  The 
general picture of PS’s control system that emerges from this research is similar to what Weber has 
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called familial or personal control. For example, there is a formal organizational chart, but it does not 
reflect the actual situation; indeed, one of the author’s interviewees asked the researcher to share any 
information on organisational structure that he might come across in the course of his research. There 
are employees who are on the payroll but do not work exclusively for the company. Employees are 
seen as personal retainers who can be assigned to any duties as the family sees fit. Notwithstanding 
the formal existence of management committees and a board of directors, the day-to-day control of 
production and sales is in the hands of two individuals, the CEO and the Finance Director. These two 
individuals report directly, and via a number of informal channels, to the two brothers who are 
respectively the chairman and vice chairman of the group which controls the company. Probably even 
more important is that their focus is almost entirely on the company’s cash position and the 
maintenance of secrecy concerning it. Whilst it contradicts the Western or modern rationale for 
managerial efficiency, such an approach to the management of finance is entirely consonant with a 
version of capitalism which views the enterprise primarily as a means of familial support, a familiar 
picture in a traditional setting.  
 
There were suspicions that company cash was being siphoned off to fund outside activities, legal or 
illegal.  ‘Proprietorial drawings’ of this type mean that the company’s stated profit of £2.8m on 
£23.5m turnover far understates the actual rate at which surplus value is being extracted. More 
justifiable as profitable investments, the interviews also revealed that illicit payments were being 
made in order to corrupt government officials, trade union leaders and tax officials. Recent court cases 
against the two brothers may testify to the above claims (The Financial Express, 2007). Secrecy, as 
well as the personal control of cash, is obviously integral to such an approach to the strategic 
management of finance. This sort of unrestricted personal control is exactly what one would expect of 
a family-controlled enterprise in a traditional society where the enabling conditions of rational 
bureaucratic administration and accounting controls are absent. 
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Domination vs. resistance is the second axis of control. Bureaucracy is a means of domination whose 
use and direction is distinct and whose consequences for social action are central to organisational 
analyses. However, these may take a new form if the organisation is situated in a traditional society, 
as indicated in Table One. Dyball and Valcarcel (1999), referring to Weber’s work, argue that: 
“Traditionalist domination is commonly exercised by members of a ruling family(ies) or clan(s) and, 
unlike legal authority, is primarily based on personal loyalty.” This is very consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented earlier. PS is officially a public limited company. The family (or the 
group) owns5 around 40% of the total shares, yet the employees feel that their loyalty is to the family. 
The two brothers have long-term friends who would eventually give them the overall majority if they 
needed it. The remaining shareholders are scattered and have never attempted to challenge the current 
regime6. Uddin and Choudhury (2007) reported how public limited companies in Bangladesh were 
able to dodge corporate rules and regulations and deny their minority shareholders’ rights. In addition, 
the traditional attitudes of the current employees, coupled with pragmatic factors such as fear of 
losing their jobs, enable the family to maintain exclusive control over the company. Since its 
inception, many of PS’s employees have been appointed by the family. Some of the employees often 
work for other companies belonging to the group and do not see any problem with this arrangement. 
The family domination at PS is carried out by two top managers. Probably even more important from 
the point of view of the brothers and their families is the control exerted by the Finance Director on 
their behalf. These two powerful individuals have special relationships with the family members and 
have thereby become, in Weberian terms, fictive kin.  
 
Many employees, having been appointed directly by the family, have no qualms about showing their 
loyalty to these two top managers. This is another example of a master – servant relationship, as 
expected by Weber in a traditional society such as Bangladesh. Case study evidence shows that 
personal relationships and familial-type control seems to be more effective than the bureaucratic 
domination in their Western counterparts. However, the role of accounting in familial and direct 
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control is still important, but mainly because it serves the substantive purposes of the family. The role 
of budgeting, as mentioned earlier, is crucial in accounting and appropriating surplus value, albeit in a 
different manner than in Western enterprises. Although routine, regular, downwards reporting to 
managers in the western sense is absentthe budgets play an important role in controls. For example, 
each of the 608 sales representatives has a bonus-linked budgetary target and the executive (sales) 
director receives information – some of it hourly – not only on the company’s sales but also on those 
of competitors. Production budgets are continually revised on basis of this information and the 
achievement of these budgets is personally monitored by the CEO. Adverse variances from these two 
sets of budgets often cause panic, since all of the managers concerned are clear that their own survival 
is at stake. This is a typical example of how families or their agents (fictive kin) take advantage of any 
managerial technologies that are available to them, including budgeting, to serve their own interests. 
This has also been reflected in other aspects of control such as performance measurement, pricing 
policy and the introduction of new products at PS. The top management and family members focus on 
physical figures such as daily sales and cash positions as indicators of the company’s performance. 
Consequently, top managers regularly pass on daily sales and cash information to family members.   
 
Weber’s works suggest that accounting practices are key elements of the bureaucratic means of 
domination in an advanced society. In a traditional society, as expected, accounting in the Western 
sense plays no role in ensuring accountability or maintaining control but is a vital element of familial 
domination, especially for communicative purposes. Weber’s axis of domination and resistance is 
useful, although resistance in a traditional society takes different shapes and forms. In this case, 
resistance by other group members within the organisation is hardly visible. The overwhelming power 
of fictive kin (mainly the CEO and the Finance Director), implicitly given by the family, coupled with 
pragmatic reasons such as compliant labour markets and poor state protection, may have contributed 
to this non-existent resistance7 (Uddin and Hopper, 2003). This is not unexpected from a company 
operating in a traditional society.  As Weber (1968) mentioned, the “master” is expected to do good 
turns, governed by an ethical sense of equity or of utilitarian expediency. That the “master” looks 
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after his “subjects” is clearly evidenced by the fact that many long-serving employees are still 
receiving benefits even though they are now no longer required by the company. The picture here is 
of a relatively simple but still flexible, timely and effective system of management controls, which 
nevertheless manages to coexist with the pre-modern secrecy and personal largesse with which the 
company’s cash is managed.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The paper concludes by considering the research aims in the introduction, namely, what forms of 
controls have management adopted in a public limited company and how, if at all, did accounting help 
achieve control at the organisational level? Could those management practices, including accounting 
(in a traditional society), be better understood by employing a Weberian framework of accounting?  
 
Management practices in PS are devoted to serving dominant owners (family members) rather than 
the majority of general shareholders. There are suspicions that company cash is being siphoned off to 
fund outside activities, ‘legal or illegal’. External accountability and reporting are allegedly 
misleading and have recently been subjected to serious investigations by various authorities. 
Delegated and modern financial budgets are absent. Financial information is only for the inner 
sanctums of the family, who exert control downwards through imposed physical targets. Sales budgets 
are focused on markets but are not participatory. There is no master budget, but the daily and weekly 
sales budgets are maintained in the light of market data from informal and formal sources. The CEO, 
being the direct agent of the family, holds enormous power over production and other managers. 
Thus, production managers exert little influence - they are there merely to execute the family’s 
commands. Control over workers was not detailed in this study but is expected to be coercive, as the 
researcher was denied access to trade unions and workers. Overall, the family manages to establish 
personalized and centralized control systems throughout the organisation. Whether this constitutes 
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better management practices is debatable. These practices bear little resemblance to what 
policymakers understand to be efficient and effective ‘private management practices’ (Adam et al., 
1992; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). 
 
The nature of control and the appropriation of surplus value by the family is better understood 
through Weber’s contrast between tradition and modernity and the respect in which the system might 
be described as substantively, as opposed to formally, rational. The theoretical framework adopted in 
this paper not only focuses on the organisational level but also goes beyond the organisation. The 
paper explores the historical, economic and political context of the case study. As argued earlier, the 
nature of family capitalism in Bangladesh is linked with the colonial legacy of Bangladesh’s political 
and economic history. Soon after 1975, at the behest of aid agencies, the Bangladeshi state started to 
sell its assets to families, or in some cases, to return the assets to Pakistani families. Thus, family 
capitalism has started to re-emerge in Bangladesh since 1975. The toothless regulatory framework 
became conducive to this particular type of capitalism. As previous studies revealed, and as Weber 
predicted, in a traditional society, regulatory frameworks are often not enforceable in the presence of 
familial relationships and politics (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Uddin and Choudhury, 2007). 
Obligations to the state become insignificant in the face of obligations to family and friends (Dyball 
and Valcarcel, 1999). This ideological and institutional context provides sufficient support to 
introduce one particular form of substantive rationality (rationality to serve families) at the 
organisational level. As shown earlier, employees shows loyalty to the family, which owns less than 
40 per cent of the total shares, rather than to general shareholders, who own more than 60 per cent of 
the shares in the company. Serving the family’s interest seems to be the natural course of action for 
employees at all levels. PS is still treated as if it were 100% owned by the family and the group. 
Domination via familial influence rather than bureaucracy is highly relevant here. Accounting 
languages and calculations provide support to family members, who seek to control the managers and 
the company at a distance. As the case study revealed, the family members do not normally interfere 
in company affairs, but are well informed about the company via certain accounting calculations such 
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as daily/weekly sales and cash positions. The familial and direct control system reported in this study 
is similar to Ansari and Bell’s (1991) findings in a family-owned business in Pakistan. Similarly, 
Uddin and Hopper (2001) found that full privatisation of a state enterprise resulted in direct control 
from a family. Employees outside of the family had little idea of the company’s performance, since 
they were not privy to financial information.  
 
Finally, the paper raises questions about policymakers’ beliefs about private management practices, 
especially in LDCs. However, the paper calls for more research, especially employing social theories 
such as Weber’s works into accounting. This would particularly enable researchers to link internal 
and external layers to understand management practices, including accounting, in traditional settings. 
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Table One 
 Axis of Control Organisations in a Modern 
society 
Organisations in a Traditional 
society 
1st Axis: Rationalities: 
Rational vs. Substantive 
Rely on bureaucratic 
mechanisms or formal processes
Rely on family type/informal 
control mechanisms  
2nd Axis: Domination vs. 
Resistance  
Domination via rational 
accounting processes  (subject 
to resistance) 
Domination via familial 
relationships (subject to 
resistance) 
 
 
  
 1A manager is someone who supervises more than one individual. 
2There are a number of reasons for the continued success of pharmaceuticals in Bangladesh. First, multinational 
companies have limited access to the local market, and also, multinational products are very expensive for the 
local markets. Bangladesh enjoys Least Developed Country (“LDC”) status, which allows the Company to 
operate in a favourable international intellectual property and regulatory environment. In particular, it is 
permitted under the TRIPS Guidelines (Trade Related aspects of International Property rights) to reverse 
engineer on-patent pharmaceutical products and sell such products within Bangladesh and to other LDCs.  
 
 
 
39
  
 
Secondly, taking advantage of cheap labour, PS is able to supply quality products at lower rates, whereas 
workers in multinational companies are highly paid and their products are thereby expensive (Hossain, 2005).  
3 Employees include all (managers, clerical staff) but production workers.   
4 Both the chairman and the vice chairman of this company have now been arrested as a result of serious 
allegations such as tax avoidance, loan default and various other irregularities. These are still under 
investigation (The Daily Star, February 05, 2007).  
5 The two brothers have long-term friends who would eventually give them the overall majority if necessary. 
Interestingly, they have never had to call for help from their friends, according to the managers. 
6A lack of investment opportunities and the possibility of capital gains often attract general shareholders to hold 
on to their shares. In the case of PS, it is one of the few companies to show consistent profits in their annual 
reports. 
7 The paper does not deny the fact that there may be covert resistance among shop floor workers. Since the 
researcher did not have access to shop floor workers, the fieldwork mainly focused on the managers and lower 
level employees. 
